Foreign Policy

The action in Syria reminded us of its neighbor to the north, Turkey, whose views on global geopolitics seem to be quite different from the U.S.’s (and much of Western Europe’s) views.

So we agreed to discuss the NATO alliance and the varying geopolitics “bents” of many of its members–especially those whose perspectives differ materially from the mainstream–such as, perhaps, Hungary and Turkey.

Is the alliance structurally suitable to accommodate those who are active intermediaries with Putin’s Russia? Is there a fundamental misalignment of values amongst the member countries? What “veto” rights can individual members assert, and how can they affect NATO’s effectiveness?

Here are some links from one of our participants:

1. The NATO website (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm) with background information about the organization, its history, a list of current member states, and the text of the North Atlantic.Treaty that created it.
2. A July 2023 opinion piece in The New York Times (https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/11/opinion/nato-summit-vilnius-europe.html?smid=em-share) arguing that NATO is not the mutual defense organization it purports to be.
3. A Wikipedia article (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO) describing the history of NATO enlargement, the criteria and process for admitting new members, and the list of the three current aspirant countries (Bosnia and Herzogovina, Georgia, and Ukraine).

For Monday, we’ll revisit U.S. support for Ukraine in the context of recent developments. In particular, we’ll start with the following two questions:

• Should the U.S. authorize the use of Western-supplied weapons against military targets in Russian territory without limit? If not, what limits seem reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances?
• Should the U.S. and its Western allies provide “frozen” Russian assets (bank deposits) to Ukraine to help that country finance its war effort?

If we move to China, we might discuss:

• What lessons do we think China will take away from the U.S.’ support for Ukraine v. Russia in recent years? Are these the lessons we want them to “learn?” What, if anything, should we be doing differently vis-a-vis Ukraine to send China the signals we want?
• China and the Philippines have been skirmishing at an increasing rate in the South China Sea over the past few months. What should U.S. policy be with respect to these skirmishes? Stand by and watch? Express displeasure through diplomatic means? Provide tangible non-military support to the Philippines? Provide military support (like by moving some Navy vessels into the “hot zone”)?

And I’m sure we’ll find more to discuss along the way. See you Monday.

This coming Monday, we will discuss the question: “Is the U.S. still effective in influencing global events?”

As supplied by one of our regular participants:

We have discussed various individual conflicts and touched on potential political differences in approach to some of the situations like NATO, Russia, China and the Middle East.  Regardless of politics over the years, the U.S. foreign policy has held a remarkably uniform consensus.  The Executive and Legislative branch implements foreign policy, but what are the determinants of U.S. foreign policy – the Council on Foreign Relations, State Department bureaucracy, established think tanks, international corporations, academic establishment, “military-industrial complex”, global elites (Davos)?often discuss U.S. foreign policy in the context of a specific world event or challenge—Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the war in Gaza, U.S. strategy toward China’s various initiatives.

If not, is U.S. effectiveness diminished because of lack of will, competence, loss of economic and military power, international status, or just the inevitability of the multipolar international forces.  What should be the response – disengagement or reengagement – or another paradigm?

Thank you to Richard for the above topic. Here’s an Op-Ed piece with one person’s view to get us started. Richard notes the obvious…that there are plenty of other perspectives, sources, and pundits with a view. We have six days before the next meeting to curate our favorites.